Ruthenium-106 has been detected by several European networks involved in the monitoring of atmospheric radioactive contamination, at levels of a few milliBecquerels per cubic meter of air.

Ruthenium-106 is a radionuclide of artificial origin. It is a fission product from the nuclear industry. This radionuclide is also used in the medical field for brachytherapy treatments

So far, IRSN calculations, based on the concentration levels measured in several European countries and on the meteorological conditions of the last few days, seem to indicate that the contamination air could have been generated from southern regions of Ural or located close to those. IRSN is continuing its investigations to try to confirm the origin of this atmospheric pollution.

As a reminder, in France, only the station of Seyne-sur-Mer (Var) shows the presence of ruthenium-106 at trace levels (7.7 micro-Bq/m³). The results of measurement of the filters of the other stations of IRSN do not show the presence of this radionuclide. All the measurement results are shown in the table below.

The ​low levels of atmospheric contamination of ruthenium-106 observed to date by European monitoring networks have no environmental or health consequences. Nevertheless, IRSN maintains a watchful vigilance on this presence of ruthenium in the air.

Ruthenium-106 has been detected by several European networks involved in the monitoring of atmospheric radioactive contamination. Ruthenium-106 is a radionuclide of artificial origin. It is a fission product from the nuclear industry. This radionuclide is also used in the medical field for brachytherapy treatments.

The Austrian Ministry of the Environment published Tuesday October 3rd 2017 a statement indicating that it detected small quantities of ruthenium without consequences for environment and health. The Norwegian Nuclear Safety Authority (NRPA) issued a press release also reporting low levels of ruthenium in the atmosphere.

For its part, the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) gave its first results of measurements indicating "low levels of radioactivity in the air". These measurements "revealed traces of ruthenium-106, a radioactive element with a half-life of 373.6 days, in aerosols taken from Cadenazzo, Ticino, between 25 September and 2 October 2017. The concentration of ruthenium 106 amounts to about 40 micro-Bq/m³, which is 17,000 times lower than the limit of air emissions set for this radionuclide in the Radiation Protection Ordinance."

Since October 3, 2017, IRSN has mobilized all its measurement stations for atmospheric monitoring and undertook the analysis of their filter samples [1].

Analysis of the filters at the Orsay (91) and Grenoble (38) stations gives results of less than 50 micro-Bq/m³. It should be noted that the weather conditions of the last 48 hours did not favor the transfer of air masses from Eastern Europe to Western Europe. On the basis of the weather conditions of the last days, retro-trajectory calculations are under way, to try to determine the origin of this air pollution.

The very low levels of atmospheric contamination of ruthenium-106 observed to date by European monitoring networks have no environmental or health consequences. Nevertheless, IRSN maintains a watchful vigilance on this presence of ruthenium in the air.

Note:

1. In France, IRSN is responsible for monitoring the radioactivity of the atmosphere on a nation-wide scale. Its surveillance network OPERA-Air includes high-volume aerosol samplers (700 to 900 m³ of air per hour) and measurement equipment capable of detecting trace amounts of radioactivity.

The guidelines presented at the final meeting of the European Shamisen project underlines the importance of involving population in the management of an accident and taking into account the economic and social upheavals and the psychological effects, particularly in the context of an emergency evacuation.​​

Download the report Recommendations and procedures for preparedness and health surveillance of populations affected by a radiation accident​​ (PDF, 338 Ko)​

What to do or not to do in case of a nuclear accident? How to improve the health surveillance and living conditions of affected population? Because the decisions taken at the time of the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents sometimes "did more harm than good", the European Commission funded the Shamisen project, a research program that brought together 19 European and Japanese organizations including IRSN, as well as American, Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian experts. ​

Resarchers agreed to set 28 recommendations to improve the emergency and preparedness to a nuclear accident, the early and intermediate phase and the long-term recovery phase. General principles that can be applied to other types of accidents and disaster have also been identified.

The guidelines aim to extend the management of the nuclear accident beyond the protection of population from exposure to ionizing radiation alone. Measures such as the emergency evacuation have important psychosocial that must be taken into account.

To summarize, the recommendations focus on three main objectives (see infographics above to involve affected populations in the decision making process alongside experts and authorities:

• Take in​to account the well-being of the affected populations;
• Foster participation of affected population and other stakeholders such as medical staff;
• Respect the autonomy and dignity of the affected populations.

All major aspects on nuclear accident management are concerned: evacuation of populations, measurement and dose assessment, health surveillance, epidemiological studies and communication.

For example, local facilitators should make the link between the experts and the affected populations to allow everyone to make a choice based on reliable, timely and up-to-date information. Population should also be encouraged to participate freely in epidemiological studies in order to improve their relevance, efficiency and acceptability. However, it is important to ensure that these studies are informative and sustainable over time the findings are communicated in a clear understandable language to all concerned.

Some of the recommendations of the S​​​hamisen project have already been implemented in France and are included in the French National Plan for Response to a Major Nuclear or Radiological Accident published in February 2014.​

Iodine-131 (131I), a radionuclide of anthropogenic origin, has recently been detected in tiny amounts in the ground-level atmosphere in Europe. The preliminary report states it was first found during week 2 of January 2017 in northern Norway. Iodine-131 was also detected in Finland, Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, France and Spain, until the end of January.

Iodine-131 is a radionuclide with a short half-life (T1/2 = 8.04 day). The detection of this radionuclide is proof of a rather recent release.

Besides the iodine release, the origin of which is still unknown, the poor dispersion conditions due to the thermal stratification [1] of the atmosphere also affected the observed concentration levels, including those of naturally occurring radionuclides such as Lead-210 (210Pb) [2], or fine particles (PM2.5 and PM10) leading to pollution episodes, particularly in the Western part of Europe during week 4 of January.

It must be pointed out that only particulate iodine was reported. When detectable, gaseous iodine is usually dominant and can be estimated to be 3 to 5 times higher than the fraction of particulate iodine.

In France, particulate 131I reached 0.31 µBq/m³ and thus the total (gaseous + particulate fractions) can be estimated at about 1.5 µBq/m³. These levels raise no health concerns.

The data has been shared between members of an informal European network called Ring of Five gathering organizations involved in the radiological surveillance of the atmosphere. In France, IRSN is responsible for monitoring the radioactivity of the atmosphere on a nation-wide scale. Its surveillance network OPERA-Air includes high-volume aerosol samplers (700 to 900 m³ of air per hour) and measurement equipment capable of detecting trace amounts of radioactivity.

Notes:

1. Thermal stratification of the atmosphere that often affects the lower atmospheric layers in winter. The colder air at ground-level compare with altitude stuck or considerably limit atmospheric pollutant dispersion.
2. The 210Pb concentration detected by IRSN peaked at 1600 µBq/m³ in January, four times higher than the usual mean value.

A nuclear emergency response drill involving a shipment of radioactive materials between the FBFC plant in Romans-sur-Isère in southeastern France and the port of Antwerp in northwestern Belgium was carried out on April 2, 2014.

The scenario was based on a fictional collision, followed by a fire, between a truck carrying containers of enriched uranium hexafluoride and a tanker truck on the border of France and Belgium. The drill was designed primarily to test relations between the authorities in the two countries and to coordinate local resources. It will serve as the basis for a larger-scale field exercise to be organized in the near future.

Carried out as part of the project called “Innovative integrative tools and platforms to be prepared for radiological emergencies and post-accident response in Europe” (PREPARE), a project designed to develop emergency response management tools funded by the European Commission and performed with IRSN's involvement, the drill was unique in that it involved testing the relations of two bordering countries, Belgium and France, in a nuclear emergency situation. Based at the IRSN Technical Center for Emergency Response near Paris, the drill brought together some thirty people from the FANC (Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control) and ASN (the competent authorities of Belgium and France), their respective technical safety organizations (Bel V for Belgium and IRSN for France), and the French carrier TN International.

The principal purpose of the exercise was to test relations between the authorities and their coordination of local resources, and secondly to identify necessary improvements, both in terms of the formal relations between the authorities and technical support organizations and in terms of coordinating local resources. IRSN, ASN, FANC, Bel V and TNI are planning to hold another field exercise on a larger scale in the near future.

The publication by Reuters on August 5, 2013 of a news report about the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (read) has revived questions concerning the management of the contaminated water on the site of Fukushima-Daiichi.

For IRSN, there was no sudden aggravation of the situation in recent days, but statements by the authority present at the site reminding the operator TEPCO of the need to put in place as quickly as possible corrective actions regarding the diffuse contamination of the Pacific Ocean.

Volumes of contaminated water at the site are estimated at several hundreds of thousands of cubic meter. The natural phenomena that led to the accident that affected TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011 also led to flooding of the site leading to an accumulation of water in the basements of the power plant buildings. Furthermore, since the accident, the water used to cool the damaged cores of the reactors has been flowing into the basements of the buildings from where it is pumped in order to be re-used, after treatment, to cool the reactors.

However, the galleries below the plant are not completely sealed; there is a suspicion of contamination of groundwater. Tepco is trying to strengthen the leak tightness of the ground by injection of sealing products and by creating a first barrier between the facilities and the ocean (expected to be completed by mid-2014).

For more information on the situation, download the information notes by IRSN:

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident: Management of contaminated water from the damaged reactors (PDF)

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident: Contamination of the ground between the damaged reactors and the Pacific Ocean  (PDF)

For several years, IRSN has been conducting researches on the economical costs of nuclear accidents involving radioactive releases in the environment. A short presentation of these studies took place during the Eurosafe Forum in November 2012.

Preparing for a nuclear accident implies understanding potential consequences. While many specialized experts have been working on different particular aspects, surprisingly little effort has been dedicated to establishing the big picture and providing a global and balanced image of all major consequences.

IRSN has been working on the cost of nuclear accidents, an exercise which must strive to be as comprehensive as possible since any omission obviously underestimates the cost. It therefore provides (ideally) an estimate of all cost components, thus revealing the structure of accident costs, and hence sketching a global picture.

On a French PWR, it appears that controlled releases would cause an “economical” accident with limited radiological consequences when compared to other costs; in contrast, massive releases would trigger a major crisis with strong radiological consequences. The two types of crises would confront managers with different types of challenges.

More information:

Download the paper by Patrick Momal and Ludivine Pascucci-Cahen presented during the Eurosafe Forum: Massive radiological releases profoundly differ from controlled releases (pdf)

On February 12, 2013, a roof and a section of wall of the turbine hall of the C​hernobyl reactors collapsed. IRSN publishes an information note about this event which, given the available evidence, has no impact on the environment.

The collapse was caused by an accumulation of snow on the roof structural steelwork. The area is near the sarcophagus that was installed over the damaged reactor in 1986. The photos below show a view of the outer wall of the turbine hall, locally destroyed, and a view of the roof partially collapsed.

Download the information note from IRSN

In an information notice published in French on November 15 2011, IRSN reported that it had detected traces of iodine-131 in the form of airborne particles. The traces were detected in a number of samples taken by aerosol monitoring stations in the IRSN OPERA-Air network.

The results of sampling measurements taken over the first ten days of November were around a few microbecquerels per cubic meter of air (µBq/m³). These values are close to the detection limits of the most effective measuring methods.

Although iodine-131 is not normally found in the air throughout the country, its presence did not give any cause for concern for the population's health or the environment.

It was detected in France following similar detection reports in various countries in central and northern Europe. As the reasons for this radioactive pollution were unknown, IRSN performed trajectory calculations to try to locate the origin of the air masses transporting the iodine-131.

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a press release on November 17, indicating that it had received information from the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) that «… the source of the iodine-131 detected in Europe was most probably a release to the atmosphere from the Institute of Isotopes Ltd., Budapest ». The institute produces radioisotopes for healthcare, industrial, and research applications. According to the HAEA, the release is thought to have begun on September 8, 2011, with a period of increased intensity on October 12-14. The authority stated, however, that the quantity of iodine-131 released over the period was below the institute's authorized annual radioactive release limit. The cause of the release has yet to be determined and is still under investigation.

The information notice of November 30, 2011, provides an update of measurement results in France, together with IRSN's trajectory analysis of the air masses that explain the iodine-131 traces observed in Europe. Based on currently available technical data, IRSN also estimated the radiological impact of this radioactive release in the near field, in other words in the Budapest region.

More information

Download the information notice of November 30, 2011: No health risk related to airborne traces of iodine-131 from Hungary

Download the information notice of November 15, 2011: Detection in France of traces of iodine-131 in the air coming from radioactive releases in a foreign country